On A Theory of Probabilistic Deductive Databases by Lakshmanan, Laks V. S. & Sadri, Fereidoon
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
31
20
43
v1
  [
cs
.D
B]
  1
8 D
ec
 20
03
Under consideration for publication in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming 1
On A Theory of Probabilistic Deductive
Databases
LAKS V. S. LAKSHMANAN∗
Department of Computer Science
Concordia University
Montreal, Canada
and
K.R. School of Information Technology
IIT – Bombay
Mumbai, India
(e-mail: laks@cs.concordia.ca)
FEREIDOON SADRI†
Department of Mathematical Sciences
University of North Carolina
Greensboro, NC, USA
(e-mail: sadri@uncg.edu)
Abstract
We propose a framework for modeling uncertainty where both belief and doubt can be
given independent, first-class status. We adopt probability theory as the mathematical for-
malism for manipulating uncertainty. An agent can express the uncertainty in her knowl-
edge about a piece of information in the form of a confidence level, consisting of a pair
of intervals of probability, one for each of her belief and doubt. The space of confidence
levels naturally leads to the notion of a trilattice, similar in spirit to Fitting’s bilattices.
Intuitively, the points in such a trilattice can be ordered according to truth, information,
or precision. We develop a framework for probabilistic deductive databases by associating
confidence levels with the facts and rules of a classical deductive database. While the
trilattice structure offers a variety of choices for defining the semantics of probabilistic
deductive databases, our choice of semantics is based on the truth-ordering, which we find
to be closest to the classical framework for deductive databases. In addition to proposing
a declarative semantics based on valuations and an equivalent semantics based on fixpoint
theory, we also propose a proof procedure and prove it sound and complete. We show that
while classical Datalog query programs have a polynomial time data complexity, certain
query programs in the probabilistic deductive database framework do not even terminate
on some input databases. We identify a large natural class of query programs of practi-
cal interest in our framework, and show that programs in this class possess polynomial
time data complexity, i.e. not only do they terminate on every input database, they are
guaranteed to do so in a number of steps polynomial in the input database size.
∗ Research was supported by grants from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council
of Canada and NCE/IRIS.
† Research was supported by grants from NSF and UNCG.
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1 Introduction
Knowledge-base systems must typically deal with imperfection in knowledge, in
particular, in the form of incompleteness, inconsistency, and uncertainty. With
this motivation, several frameworks for manipulating data and knowledge have
been proposed in the form of extensions to classical logic programming and deduc-
tive databases to cope with imperfections in available knowledge. Abiteboul, et al.
(Abiteboul et al., 1991), Liu (Liu, 1990), and Dong and Lakshmanan (Dong & Lakshmanan, 1992)
dealt with deductive databases with incomplete information in the form of null
values. Kifer and Lozinskii (Kifer & Lozinskii, 1989; Kifer & Lozinskii, 1992) have
developed a logic for reasoning with inconsistency. Extensions to logic programming
and deductive databases for handling uncertainty are numerous. They can broadly
be categorized into non-probabilistic and probabilistic formalisms. We review previ-
ous work in these fields, with special emphasis on probabilistic logic programming,
because of its relevance to this paper.
Non-probabilistic Formalisms
(1) Fuzzy logic programming: This was essentially introduced by van Emden in his
seminal paper on quantitative deduction (van Emden, 1986), and further developed
by various researchers, including Steger et al. (Steger et al., 1989), Schmidt et al.
(Schmidt et al., 1989).
(2) Annotated logic programming: This framework was introduced by Subrahma-
nian (Subrahmanian, 1987), and later studied by Blair and Subrahmanian (Blair & Subrahmanian, 1989a;
Blair & Subrahmanian, 1989b), and Kifer and Li (Kifer & Li, 1988). While Blair
and Subrahmanian’s focus was paraconsistency, Kifer and Li extended the frame-
work of (Subrahmanian, 1987) into providing a formal semantics for rule-based sys-
tems with uncertainty. Finally, this framework was generalized by Kifer and Subrah-
manian into the generalized annotated programming (GAP) framework (Kifer & Subrahmanian, 1992)).
All these frameworks are inherently based on a lattice-theoretic semantics. Anno-
tated logic programming has also been employed with the probabilistic approach,
which we will discuss further below.
(3) Evidence theoretic logic programming: This has been mainly studied by Bald-
win and Monk (Baldwin & Monk, 1987) and Baldwin (Baldwin, 1987)). They use
Dempster’s evidence theory as the basis for dealing with uncertainty in their logic
programming framework.
Probabilistic Formalisms
Indeed, there has been substantial amount of research into probabilistic logics ever
since Boole (Boole, 1854). Carnap (Carnap, 1962) is a seminal work on probabilis-
tic logic. Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo (Fagin et al., 1990) study the satisfiability
of systems of probabilistic constraints from a model-theoretic perspective. Gaifman
(Gaifman, 1964) extends probability theory by borrowing notions and techniques
from logic. Nilsson (Nilsson, 1986) uses a “possible worlds” approach to give model-
theoretic semantics for probabilistic logic. Hailperin’s (Hailperin, 1984) notion of
probabilistic entailment is similar to that of Nilsson. Some of the probabilistic logic
programming works are based on probabilistic logic approaches, such as Ng and
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Subrahmanian’s work on probabilistic logic programming (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992)
and Ng’s recent work on empirical databases (Ng, 1997). We discuss these works
further below. We will not elaborate on probabilistic logics any more and refer the
reader to Halpern (Halpern, 1990) for additional information.
Works on probabilistic logic programming and deductive databases can be cate-
gorized into two main approaches, annotation-based, and implication based.
Annotation Based Approach: Ng and Subrahmanian (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992)
were the first to propose a probabilistic basis for logic programming. Their syntax
borrows from that of annotated logic programming (Kifer & Subrahmanian, 1992),
although the semantics are quite different. The idea is that uncertainty is always
associated with individual atoms (or their conjunctions and disjunctions), while the
rules or clauses are always kept classical.
In (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992), uncertainty in an atom is modeled by associ-
ating a probabilistic truth value with it, and by asserting that it lies in an in-
terval. The main interest is in characterizing how precisely we can “bound” the
probabilities associated with various atoms. In terms of the terminology of belief
and doubt, we can say, following Kifer and Li (Kifer & Li, 1988), that the com-
bination of belief and doubt about a piece of information might lead to an in-
terval of probabilities, as opposed a precise probabilities. But, as pointed out in
(Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992), even if one starts with precise point probabilities for
atomic events, probabilities associated with compound events can only be calcu-
lated to within some exact upper and lower bounds, thus naturally necessitating
intervals. But then, the same argument can be made for an agent’s belief as well as
doubt about a fact, i.e. they both could well be intervals. In this sense, we can say
that the model of (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992) captures only the belief. A second
important characteristic of this model is that it makes a conservative assumption
that nothing is known about the interdependence of events (captured by the atoms
in an input database), and thus has the advantage of not having to make the often
unrealistic independence assumption. However, by being conservative, it makes it
impossible to take advantage of the (partial) knowledge a user may have about the
interdependence among some of the events.
From a technical perspective, only annotation constants are allowed in (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992).
Intuitively, this means only constant probability ranges may be associated with
atoms. This was generalized in a subsequent paper by Ng and Subrahmanian
(Ng & Subrahmanian, 1993) to allow annotation variables and functions. They
have developed fixpoint and model-theoretic semantics, and provided a sound and
weakly complete proof procedure. Gu¨ntzer et al. (Gu¨ntzer et al., 1991) have pro-
posed a sound (propositional) probabilistic calculus based on conditional proba-
bilities, for reasoning in the presence of incomplete information. Although they
make use of a datalog-based interface to implement this calculus, their framework
is actually propositional. In related works, Ng and Subrahmanian have extended
their basic probabilistic logic programming framework to capture stable negation
in (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1994), and developed a basis for Dempster-Shafer theory
in (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1991).
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Implication Based Approach: While many of the quantitative deduction frame-
works (van Emden (van Emden, 1986), Fitting (Fitting, 1988; Fitting, 1991), De-
bray and Ramakrishnan (Debray & Ramakrishnan, 1994),1 etc.) are implication
based, the first implication based framework for probabilistic deductive databases
was proposed in (Lakshmanan & Sadri, 1994b). The idea behind implication based
approach is to associate uncertainty with the facts as well as rules in a deductive
database. Sadri (Sadri, 1991b; Sadri, 1991a) in a number of papers developed a hy-
brid method called Information Source Tracking (IST) for modeling uncertainty in
(relational) databases which combines symbolic and numeric approaches to model-
ing uncertainty. Lakshmanan and Sadri (Lakshmanan & Sadri, 1994a; Lakshmanan & Sadri, 1997)
pursue the deductive extension of this model using the implication based approach.
Lakshmanan (Lakshmanan, 1994) generalizes the idea behind IST to model un-
certainty by characterizing the set of (complex) scenarios under which certain
(derived) events might be believed or doubted given a knowledge of the appli-
cable belief and doubt scenarios for basic events. He also establishes a connec-
tion between this framework and modal logic. While both (Lakshmanan, 1994;
Lakshmanan & Sadri, 1994a) are implication based approaches, strictly speaking,
they do not require any commitment to a particular formalism (such a probability
theory) for uncertainty manipulation. Any formalism that allows for a consistent
calculation of numeric certainties associated with boolean combination of basic
events, based on given certainties for basic events, can be used for computing the
numeric certainties associated with derived atoms.
Recently, Lakshmanan and Shiri (Lakshmanan & Shiri, 1997) unified and gener-
alized all known implication based frameworks for deductive databases with uncer-
tainty (including those that use formalisms other than probability theory) into a
more abstract framework called the parametric framework. The notions of conjunc-
tions, disjunctions, and certainty propagations (via rules) are parameterized and
can be chosen based on the applications. Even the domain of certainty measures
can be chosen as a parameter. Under such broadly generic conditions, they proposed
a declarative semantics and an equivalent fixpoint semantics. They also proposed a
sound and complete proof procedure. Finally, they characterized conjunctive query
containment in this framework and provided necessary and sufficient conditions for
containment for several large classes of query programs. Their results can be applied
to individual implication based frameworks as the latter can be seen as instances
of the parametric framework. Conjunctive query containment is one of the central
problems in query optimization in databases. While the framework of this paper
can also be realized as an instance of the parametric framework, the concerns and
results there are substantially different from ours. In particular, to our knowledge,
this is the first paper to address data complexity in the presence of (probabilistic)
uncertainty.
1 The framework proposed in (Debray & Ramakrishnan, 1994) unifies Horn clause based com-
putations in a variety of settings, including that of quantitative deduction as proposed by van
Emden (van Emden, 1986), within one abstract formalism. However, in view of the assumptions
made in (Debray & Ramakrishnan, 1994), not all probabilistic conjunctions and disjunctions are
permitted by that formalism.
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Other Related Work
Fitting (Fitting, 1988; Fitting, 1991) has developed an elegant framework for quan-
titative logic programming based on bilattices, an algebraic structure proposed by
Ginsburg (Ginsburg, 1988) in the context of many-valued logic programming. This
was the first to capture both belief and doubt in one uniform logic programming
framework. In recent work, Lakshmanan et al. (Lakshmanan et al., 1997) have pro-
posed a model and algebra for probabilistic relational databases. This framework
allows the user to choose notions of conjunctions and disjunctions based on a fam-
ily of strategies. In addition to developing complexity results, they also address
the problem of efficient maintenance of materialized views based on their proba-
bilistic relational algebra. One of the strengths of their model is not requiring any
restrictive independence assumptions among the facts in a database, unlike pre-
vious work on probabilistic relational databases (Barbara et al., 1992). In a more
recent work, Dekhtyar and Subrahmanian (Dekhtyar & Subrahmanian, 1997) de-
veloped an annotation based framework where the user can have a parameterized
notion of conjunction and disjunction. In not requiring independence assumptions,
and being able to allow the user to express her knowledge about event interde-
pendence by means of a parametrized family of conjunctions and disjunctions,
both (Dekhtyar & Subrahmanian, 1997; Lakshmanan et al., 1997) have some simi-
larities to this paper. However, chronologically, the preliminary version of this paper
(Lakshmanan & Sadri, 1994b) was the first to incorporate such an idea in a prob-
abilistic framework. Besides, the frameworks of (Dekhtyar & Subrahmanian, 1997;
Lakshmanan et al., 1997) are substantially different from ours. In a recent work Ng
(Ng, 1997) studies empirical databases, where a deductive database is enhanced
by empirical clauses representing statistical information. He develops a model-
theoretic semantics, and studies the issues of consistency and query processing in
such databases. His treatment is probabilistic, where probabilities are obtained from
statistical data, rather than being subjective probabilities. (See Halpern (Halpern, 1990)
for a comprehensive discussion on statistical and subjective probabilities in logics
of probability.) Ng’s query processing algorithm attempts to resolve a query us-
ing the (regular) deductive component of the database. If it is not successful, then
it reverts to the empirical component, using the notion of most specific reference
class usually used in statistical inferences. Our framework is quite different in that
every rule/fact is associated with a confidence level (a pair of probabilistic inter-
vals representing belief and doubt), which may be subjective, or may have been
obtained from underlying statistical data. The emphasis of our work is on (i) the
characterization of different modes for combining confidences, (ii) semantics, and,
in particular, (iii) termination and complexity issues.
The contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We associate a confidence level with facts and rules (of a deductive database).
A confidence level comes with both a belief and a doubt2 (in what is being
2 We specifically avoid the term disbelief because of its possible implication that it is the comple-
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asserted) [see Section 2 for a motivation]. Belief and doubt are subintervals
of [0, 1] representing probability ranges.
• We show that confidence levels have an interesting algebraic structure called
trilattices as their basis (Section 3). Analogously to Fitting’s bilattices, we
show that trilattices associated with confidence levels are interlaced, making
them interesting in their own right, from an algebraic point of view. In addi-
tion to providing an algebraic footing for our framework, trilattices also shed
light on the relationship between our work and earlier works and offer useful
insights. In particular, trilattices give rise to three ways of ordering confidence
levels: the truth-order, where belief goes up and doubt comes down, the in-
formation order, where both belief and doubt go up, and the precision order,
where the probability intervals associated with both belief and doubt become
sharper, i.e. the interval length decreases. This is to be contrasted with the
known truth and information (called knowledge there) orders in a bilattice.
• A purely lattice-theoretic basis for logic programming can be constructed
using trilattices (similar to Fitting (Fitting, 1991)). However, since our focus
in this paper is probabilistic uncertainty, we develop a probabilistic calculus
for combining confidence levels associated with basic events into those for
compound events based on them (Section 4). Instead of committing to any
specific rules for combining confidences, we propose a framework which allows
a user to choose an appropriate “mode” from a collection of available ones.
• We develop a generalized framework for rule-based programming with prob-
abilistic knowledge, based on this calculus. We provide the declarative and
fixpoint semantics for such programs and establish their equivalence (Section
5). We also provide a sound and complete proof procedure (Section 6).
• We study the termination and complexity issues of such programs and show:
(1) the closure ordinal of TP can be as high as ω in general (but no more), and
(2) when only positive correlation is used for disjunction3, the data complexity
of such programs is polynomial time. Our proof technique for the last result
yields a similar result for van Emden’s framework (Section 7).
• We also compare our work with related work and bring out the advantages
and generality of our approach (Section 7).
2 Motivation
In this section, we discuss the motivation for our work as well as comment on our
design decisions for this framework. The motivation for using probability theory
as opposed to other formalisms for representing uncertainty has been discussed
at length in the literature (Carnap, 1962; Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992). Probability
theory is perhaps the best understood and mathematically well-founded paradigm
in which uncertainty can be modeled and reasoned about. Two possibilities for
ment of belief, in some sense. In our framework, doubt is not necessarily the truth-functional
complement of belief.
3 Other modes can be used (for conjunction/disjunction) in the “non-recursive part” of the pro-
gram.
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associating probabilities with facts and rules in a DDB are van Emden’s style of
associating confidences with rules as a whole (van Emden, 1986), or the annota-
tion style of Kifer and Subrahmanian (Kifer & Subrahmanian, 1992). The second
approach is more powerful: It is shown in (Kifer & Subrahmanian, 1992) that the
second approach can simulate the first. The first approach, on the other hand,
has the advantage of intuitive appeal, as pointed out by Kifer and Subrahma-
nian (Kifer & Subrahmanian, 1992). In this paper, we choose the first approach. A
comparison between our approach and annotation-based approach with respect to
termination and complexity issues is given in Section 7.
A second issue is whether we should insist on precise probabilities or allow inter-
vals (or ranges). Firstly, probabilities derived from any sources may have tolerances
associated with them. Even experts may feel more comfortable with specifying
a range rather than a precise probability. Secondly, Fenstad (Fenstad, 1980) has
shown (also see (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992)) that when enough information is not
available about the interaction between events, the probability of compound events
cannot be determined precisely: one can only give (tight) bounds. Thus, we asso-
ciate ranges of probabilities with facts and rules.
A last issue is the following. Suppose (uncertain) knowledge contributed by an
expert corresponds to the formula F . In general, we cannot assume the expert’s
knowledge is perfect. This means he does not necessarily know all situations in
which F holds. Nor does he know all situations where F fails to hold (i.e. ¬F
holds). He models the proportion of the situations where he knows F holds as
his belief in F and the proportion of situations where he knows ¬F holds as his
doubt. There could be situations, unknown to our expert, where F holds (or ¬F
holds). These unknown situations correspond to the gap in his knowledge. Thus,
as far as he knows, F is unknown or undefined in these remaining situations. These
observations, originally made by Fitting (Fitting, 1988), give rise to the following
definition.
Definition 2.1
(Confidence Level) Denote by C[0, 1] the set of all closed subintervals over [0, 1].
Consider the set Lc =def C[0, 1]× C[0, 1]. A Confidence Level is an element of Lc.
We denote a confidence level as 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉.
In our approach confidence levels are associated with facts and rules. The in-
tended meaning of a fact (or rule) F having a confidence 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉 is that α
and β are the lower and upper bounds of the expert’s belief in F , and γ and δ
are the lower and upper bounds of the expert’s doubt in F . These notions will be
formalized in Section 4.
The following example illustrates such a scenario. (The figures in all our examples
are fictitious.)
Example 2.1
Consider the results of Gallup polls conducted before the recent Canadian federal
elections.
1. Of the people surveyed, between 50% and 53% of the people in the age group 19
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to 30 favor the liberals.
2. Between 30% and 33% of the people in the above age group favor the reformists.
3. Between 5% and 8% of the above age group favor the tories.
The reason we have ranges for each category is that usually some tolerance is
associated with the results coming from such polls. Also, we do not make the pro-
portion of undecided people explicit as our interest is in determining the support
for the different parties. Suppose we assimilate the information above in a prob-
abilistic framework. For each party, we compute the probability that a randomly
chosen person from the sample population of the given age group will (not) vote
for that party. We transfer this probability as the subjective probability that any
person from that age group (in the actual population) will (not) vote for the party.
The conclusions are given below, where vote(X,P ) says X will vote for party P ,
age-group1(X) says X belongs to the age group specified above. liberals, reform,
and tories are constants, with the obvious meaning.
1. vote(X, liberals)
〈[0.5,0.53],[0.35,0.41]〉
< age-group1(X).
2. vote(X, reform):
〈[0.3,0.33],[0.55,0.61]〉
< age-group1(X).
3. vote(X, tories):
〈[0.05,0.08],[0.8,0.86]〉
< age-group1(X).
As usual, each rule is implicitly universally quantified outside the entire rule.
Each rule is expressed in the form
A
〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉
< Body
where α, β, γ, δ ∈ [0, 1]. We usually require that α ≤ β and γ ≤ δ. With each
rule, we have associated two intervals. [α, β] ([γ, δ]) is the belief (doubt) the expert
has in the rule. Notice that from his knowledge, the expert can only conclude
that the proportion of people he knows favor reform or tories will not vote for
liberals. Thus the probability that a person in the age group 19-30 will not vote for
liberals, according to the expert’s knowledge, is in the range [0.35, 0.41], obtained by
summing the endpoints of the belief ranges for reform and tories. Notice that in this
case α+ δ (or β+ γ) is not necessarily 1. This shows we cannot regard the expert’s
doubt as the complement (with respect to 1) of his belief. Thus, if we have to model
what necessarily follows according to the expert’s knowledge, then we must carry
both the belief and the doubt explicitly. Note that this example suggests just one
possible means by which confidence levels could be obtained from statistical data.
As discussed before, gaps in an expert’s knowledge could often directly result in
both belief and doubt. In general, there could be many ways in which both belief
and doubt could be obtained and associated with the basic facts. Given this, we
believe that an independent treatment of both belief and doubt is both necessary
and interesting for the purpose of obtaining the confidence levels associated with
derived facts. Our approach to independently capture belief and doubt makes it
possible to cope with incomplete knowledge regarding the situations in which an
event is true, false, or unknown in a general setting.
Kifer and Li (Kifer & Li, 1988) and Baldwin (Baldwin, 1987) have argued that
incorporating both belief and doubt (called disbelief there) is useful in dealing
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with incomplete knowledge, where different evidences may contradict each other.
However, in their frameworks, doubt need not be maintained explicitly. For suppose
we have a belief b and a disbelief d associated with a phenomenon. Then they can
both be absorbed into one range [b, 1 − d] indicating that the effective certainty
ranges over this set. The difference with our framework, however, is that we model
what is known definitely, as opposed to what is possible. This makes (in our case)
an explicit treatment of belief and doubt mandatory.
3 The Algebra of Confidence Levels
Fitting (Fitting, 1991) has shown that bilattices (introduced by Ginsburg (Ginsburg, 1988))
lead to an elegant framework for quantified logic programming involving both belief
and doubt. In this section, we shall see that a notion of trilattices naturally arises
with confidence levels. We shall establish the structure and properties of trilattices
here, which will be used in later sections.
Definition 3.1
Denote by C[0, 1] the set of all closed subintervals over [0, 1]. Consider the set
Lc =def C[0, 1]×C[0, 1]. We denote the elements of Lc as 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉. Define the
following orders on this set. Let 〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉, 〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 be any two
elements of Lc.
〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉 ≤t 〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 iff α1 ≤ α2, β1 ≤ β2 and γ2 ≤ γ1, δ2 ≤ δ1
〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉 ≤k 〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 iff α1 ≤ α2, β1 ≤ β2 and γ1 ≤ γ2, δ1 ≤ δ2
〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉 ≤p 〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 iff α1 ≤ α2, β2 ≤ β1 and γ1 ≤ γ2, δ2 ≤ δ1
Some explanation is in order. The order ≤t can be considered the truth ordering:
“truth” relative to the expert’s knowledge increases as belief goes up and doubt
comes down. The order ≤k is the knowledge (or information) ordering: “knowledge”
(i.e. the extent to which the expert commits his opinion on an assertion) increases as
both belief and doubt increase. The order ≤p is the precision ordering: “precision”
of information supplied increases as the probability intervals become narrower. The
first two orders are analogues of similar orders in bilattices. The third one, however,
has no counterpart there. It is straightforward to see that each of the orders ≤t,
≤k, and ≤p is a partial order. Lc has a least and a greatest element with respect to
each of these orders. In the following, we give the definition of meet and join with
respect to the ≤t order. Operators with respect to the other orders have a similar
definition.
Definition 3.2
Let 〈Lc,≤t,≤k,≤p〉 be as defined in Definition 3.1. Then the meet and join corre-
sponding to the truth, knowledge (information), and precision orders are defined as
follows. The symbols ⊗ and ⊕ denote meet and join, and the subscripts t, k, and p
represent truth, knowledge, and precision, respectively.
1. 〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉⊗t〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 =
〈[min{α1, α2},min{β1, β2}], [max{γ1, γ2},max{δ1, δ2}]〉.
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2. 〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉⊕t〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 =
〈[max{α1, α2},max{β1, β2}], [min{γ1, γ2},min{δ1, δ2}]〉.
3. 〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉⊗k〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 =
〈[min{α1, α2},min{β1, β2}], [min{γ1, γ2},min{δ1, δ2}]〉.
4. 〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉⊕k〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 =
〈[max{α1, α2},max{β1, β2}], [max{γ1, γ2},max{δ1, δ2}]〉.
5. 〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉⊗p〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 =
〈[min{α1, α2},max{β1, β2}], [min{γ1, γ2},max{δ1, δ2}]〉.
6. 〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉⊕p〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 =
〈[max{α1, α2},min{β1, β2}], [max{γ1, γ2},min{δ1, δ2}]〉.
The top and bottom elements with respect to the various orders are as follows.
The subscripts indicate the associated orders, as usual.
⊤t = 〈[1, 1], [0, 0]〉, ⊥t = 〈[0, 0], [1, 1]〉,
⊤k = 〈[1, 1], [1, 1]〉, ⊥k = 〈[0, 0], [0, 0]〉,
⊤p = 〈[1, 0], [1, 0]〉, ⊥p = 〈[0, 1], [0, 1]〉.
⊤t corresponds to total belief and no doubt; ⊥t is the opposite. ⊤k represents
maximal information (total belief and doubt), to the point of being probabilisti-
cally inconsistent: belief and doubt probabilities sum to more than 1; ⊥k gives
the least information: no basis for belief or doubt; ⊤p is maximally precise, to the
point of making the intervals empty (and hence inconsistent, in a non-probabilistic
sense); ⊥p is the least precise, as it imposes only trivial bounds on belief and doubt
probabilities.
Fitting (Fitting, 1991) defines a bilattice to be interlaced whenever the meet and
join with respect to any order of the bilattice are monotone with respect to the
other order. He shows that it is the interlaced property of bilattices that makes
them most useful and attractive. We say that a trilattice is interlaced provided the
meet and join with respect to any order are monotone with respect to any other
order. We have
Lemma 3.1
The trilattice 〈Lc,≤t,≤k,≤p〉 defined above is interlaced.
Proof. Follows directly from the fact that max and min are monotone functions.
We show the proof for just one case. Let 〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉 ≤p 〈[α3, β3], [γ3, δ3]〉
and 〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 ≤p 〈[α4, β4], [γ4, δ4]〉. Then
〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉⊗t〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 =
〈[min{α1, α2},min{β1, β2}], [max{γ1, γ2},max{δ1, δ2}]〉
〈[α3, β3], [γ3, δ3]〉⊗t〈[α4, β4], [γ4, δ4]〉 =
〈[min{α3, α4},min{β3, β4}], [max{γ3, γ4},max{δ3, δ4}]〉
Since α1 ≤ α3, β3 ≤ β1, α2 ≤ α4, β4 ≤ β2, we havemin{α1, α2} ≤ min{α3, α4}, and
min{β3, β4} ≤ min{β1, β2}. Similarly,min{γ1, γ2} ≤ min{γ3, γ4} andmin{δ3, δ4} ≤
min{δ1, δ2}. This implies
〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉⊗t〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 ≤p 〈[α3, β3], [γ3, δ3]〉⊗t〈[α4, β4], [γ4, δ4]〉
Other cases are similar.
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Trilattices are of independent interest in their own right, from an algebraic point
of view. We also stress that they can be used as a basis for developing quanti-
fied/annotated logic programming schemes (which need not be probabilistic). This
will be pursued in a future paper.
In closing this section, we note that other orders are also possible for confidence
levels. In fact, Fitting has shown that a fourth order, denoted by ≤f in the following,
together with the three orders defined above, forms an interlaced “quadri-lattice”
(Fitting, 1995). He also pointed out that this “quadri-lattice” can be generated as
the cross product of two bilattices. Intuitively, a confidence level increases according
to this fourth ordering, when the precision of the belief component of a confidence
level goes up, while that of the doubt component goes down. That is,
〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉 ≤f 〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉 iff α1 ≤ α2, β2 ≤ β1 and γ2 ≤ γ1, δ1 ≤ δ2
In our opinion, the fourth order, while technically elegant, does not have the same
intuitive appeal as the three orders – truth, knowledge, and precision – mentioned
above. Hence, we do not consider it further in this paper. The algebraic properties of
confidence levels and their underlying lattices are interesting in their own right, and
might be used for developing alternative bases for quantitative logic programming.
This issue is orthogonal to the concerns of this paper.
4 A Probabilistic Calculus
Given the confidence levels for (basic) events, how are we to derive the confi-
dence levels for compound events which are based on them? Since we are work-
ing with probabilities, our combination rules must respect probability theory. We
need a model of our knowledge about the interaction between events. A simplis-
tic model studied in the literature (e.g. see Barbara et al. (Barbara et al., 1990))
assumes independence between all pairs of events. This is highly restrictive and
is of limited applicability. A general model, studied by Ng and Subrahmanian
(Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992; Ng & Subrahmanian, 1993) is that of ignorance: as-
sume no knowledge about event interaction. Although this is the most general
possible situation, it can be overly conservative when some knowledge is available,
concerning some of the events. We argue that for “real-life” applications, no single
model of event interaction would suffice. Indeed, we need the ability to “parameter-
ize” the model used for event interaction, depending on what is known about the
events themselves. In this section, we develop a probabilistic calculus which allows
the user to select an appropriate “mode” of event interaction, out of several choices,
to suit his needs.
Let L be an arbitrary, but fixed, first-order language with finitely many constants,
predicate symbols, infinitely many variables, and no function symbols 4. We use
(ground) atoms of L to represent basic events. We blur the distinction between an
event and the formula representing it. Our objective is to characterize confidence
4 In deductive databases, it is standard to restrict attention to function free languages. Since
input databases are finite (as they are in reality), this leads to a finite Herbrand base.
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levels of boolean combinations of events involving the connectives ¬,∧,∨, in terms
of the confidence levels of the underlying basic events under various modes (see
below).
We gave an informal discussion of the meaning of confidence levels in Section
2. We use the concept of possible worlds to formalize the semantics of confidence
levels.
Definition 4.1
(Semantics of Confidence Levels) According to the expert’s knowledge, an event
F can be true, false, or unknown. This gives rise to 3 possible worlds. Let 1, 0,⊥
respectively denote true, false, and unknown. Let Wi denote the world where the
truth-value of F is i, i ∈ {0, 1,⊥}, and let wi denote the probability of the world
Wi Then the assertion that the confidence level of F is 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉, written
conf (F ) = 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉, corresponds to the following constraints:
α ≤ w1 ≤ β
γ ≤ w0 ≤ δ
wi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 0,⊥}
Σiwi = 1
(1)
where α and β are the lower and upper bounds of the belief in F , and γ and δ are
the lower and upper bounds of the doubt in F .
Equation (1) imposes certain restrictions on confidence levels.
Definition 4.2
(Consistent confidence levels) We say a confidence level 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉 is consistent
if Equation (1) has an answer.
It is easily seen that:
Proposition 4.1
Confidence level 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉 is consistent provided (i) α ≤ β and γ ≤ δ, and (ii)
α+ γ ≤ 1.
The consistency condition guarantees at least one solution to Equation (1). How-
ever, given a confidence level 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉, there may be w1 values in the [α, β]
interval for which no w0 value exists in the [γ, δ] interval to form an answer to
Equation (1), and vice versa. We can “trim” the upperbounds of 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉 as
follows to guarantee that for each value in the [α, β] interval there is at least one
value in the [γ, δ] interval which form an answer to Equation (1).
Definition 4.3
(Reduced confidence level) We say a confidence level 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉 is reduced if for
all w1 ∈ [α, β] there exist w0, w⊥ such that w1, w0, w⊥ is a solution to Equation
(1), and for all w0 ∈ [γ, δ] there exist w1, w⊥ such that w1, w0, w⊥ is a solution to
Equation (1).
It is obvious that a reduced confidence level is consistent.
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Proposition 4.2
Confidence level 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉 is reduced provided (i) α ≤ β and γ ≤ δ, and (ii)
α+ δ ≤ 1, and β + γ ≤ 1.
Proposition 4.3
Let c = 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉 be a consistent confidence level. Let β′ = 1 − γ and δ′ =
1 − α. Then, the confidence level c′ = [α,min(β, β′)], [γ,min(δ, δ′)] is a reduced
confidence level. Further, c and c′ are probabilistically equivalent, in the sense that
they produce exactly the same answer sets to Equation (1).
Data in a probabilistic deductive database, that is, facts and rules that comprise
the database, are associated with confidence levels. At the atomic level, we require
the confidence levels to be consistent. This means each expert, or data source,
should be consistent with respect to the confidence levels it provides. This does not
place any restriction on data provided by different experts/sources, as long as each
is individually consistent. Data provided by different experts/sources should be
combined, using an appropriate combination mode (discussed in next section). We
will show that the combination formulas for the various modes preserve consistent
as well as reduced confidence levels.
4.1 Combination Modes
Now, we introduce the various modes and characterize conjunction and disjunction
under these modes. Let F and G represent two arbitrary ground (i.e. variable-free)
formulas. For a formula F , conf (F ) will denote its confidence level. In the following,
we describe several interesting and natural modes and establish some results on the
confidence levels of conjunction and disjunction under these modes. Some of the
modes are well known, although care needs to be taken to allow for the 3-valued
nature of our framework.
1. Ignorance: This is the most general situation possible: nothing is assumed/known
about event interaction between F and G. The extent of the interaction between
F and G could range from maximum overlap to minimum overlap.
2. Independence: This is a well-known mode. It simply says (non-)occurrence of one
event does not influence that of the other.
3. Positive Correlation: This mode corresponds to the knowledge that the occur-
rences of two events overlap as much as possible. This means the conditional prob-
ability of one of the events (the one with the larger probability) given the other is
1.
4. Negative Correlation: This is the exact opposite of positive correlation: the oc-
currences of the events overlap minimally.
5. Mutual Exclusion: This is a special case of negative correlation, where we know
that the sum of probabilities of the events does not exceed 1.
We have the following results.
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Proposition 4.4
Let F be any event, and let conf (F ) = 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉. Then conf (¬F ) = 〈[γ, δ], [α, β]〉.
Thus, negation simply swaps belief and doubt.
Proof. Follows from the observation that conf (F ) = 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉 implies that
α ≤ w1 ≤ β and γ ≤ w0 ≤ δ, where w1 (w0) denotes the probability of the possible
world where event F is true (false).
The following theorem establishes the confidence levels of compound formulas as
a function of those of the constituent formulas, under various modes.
Theorem 4.1
Let F and G be any events and let conf (F ) = 〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉 and conf (G) =
〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉. Then the confidence levels of the compound events F ∧ G and
F ∨G are given as follows. (In each case the subscript denotes the mode.)
conf (F ∧ig G) =
〈[max{0, α1 + α2 − 1},min{β1, β2}], [max{γ1, γ2}, min{1, δ1 + δ2}]〉.
conf (F∨igG) = 〈[max{α1, α2},min{1, β1+β2}], [max{0, γ1+γ2−1},min{δ1, δ2}]〉.
conf (F ∧indG) = 〈[α1×α2, β1×β2], [1− (1−γ1)× (1−γ2), 1− (1− δ1)× (1− δ2)]〉.
conf (F ∨indG) = 〈[1− (1−α1)× (1−α2), 1− (1−β1)× (1−β2)], [γ1×γ2, δ1× δ2]〉.
conf (F ∧pc G) = 〈[min{α1, α2},min{β1, β2}], [max{γ1, γ2},max{δ1, δ2}]〉.
conf (F ∨pc G) = 〈[max{α1, α2},max{β1, β2}], [min{γ1, γ2},min{δ1, δ2}]〉.
conf (F ∧nc G) =
〈[max{0, α1 + α2 − 1},max{0, β1 + β2 − 1}], [min{1, γ1 + γ2},min{1, δ1 + δ2}]〉.
conf (F ∨nc G) =
〈[min{1, α1 + α2},min{1, β1 + β2}], [max{0, γ1 + γ2 − 1},max{0, δ1 + δ2 − 1}]〉.
conf (F ∧me G) = 〈[0, 0], [min{1, γ1 + γ2},min{1, δ1 + δ2}]〉.
conf (F ∨me G) = 〈[α1 + α2, β1 + β2], [max{0, γ1 + γ2 − 1},max{0, δ1 + δ2 − 1}]〉.
Proof. Each mode is characterized by a system of constraints, and the confidence
level of the formulas F ∧ G,F ∨ G are obtained by extremizing certain objective
functions subject to these constraints.
The scope of the possible interaction between F and G can be characterized as
follows (also see (Frechet, M., 1935; Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992)). According to the
expert’s knowledge, each of F,G can be true, false, or unknown. This gives rise to
9 possible worlds. Let 1, 0,⊥ respectively denote true, false, and unknown. Let Wij
denote the world where the truth-value of F is i and that of G is j, i, j ∈ {1, 0,⊥}.
E.g. , W10 is the world where F is true and G is false, while W0⊥ is the world
where F is false and G is unknown. Suppose wij denotes the probability associated
with world Wij . Then the possible scope of interaction between F and G can be
characterized by the following constraints.
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α1 ≤ w10 + w1⊥ + w11 ≤ β1
γ1 ≤ w00 + w0⊥ + w01 ≤ δ1
α2 ≤ w01 + w⊥1 + w11 ≤ β2
γ2 ≤ w00 + w⊥0 + w10 ≤ δ2
wij ≥ 0, i, j ∈ {1, 0,⊥}
Σi,jwij = 1
(2)
The above system of constraints must be satisfied for all modes. Specific con-
straints for various modes are obtained by adding more constraints to those in
Equation (2). In all cases, the confidence levels for F ∧G and F ∨G are obtained
as follows.
conf (F ◦G) = 〈[min(ΣWij |=F◦Gwij),max(ΣWij |=F◦Gwij)],
[min(ΣWij 6|=F◦Gwij),max(ΣWij 6|=F◦Gwij)]〉
where ◦ is ∧ or ∨.
Case 1: Ignorance.
The constraints for ignorance are exactly those in Equation (2). The solution to
the above linear program can be shown to be
conf (F ∧G) = 〈[max{0, α1+α2−1},min{β1, β2}], [max{γ1, γ2}, min{1, δ1+δ2}]〉,
conf (F ∨G) = 〈[max{α1, α2},min{1, β1+β2}], [max{0, γ1+γ2−1},min{δ1, δ2}]〉.
The proof is very similar to the proof of a similar result in the context of belief
intervals (no doubt) by Ng and Subrahmanian (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992).
Case 2: Independence.
Independence of events F and G can be characterized by the equation P (F |G) =
P (F ), where P (F |G) is the conditional probability of the event F given event G.
More specifically, since in our model an event can be true, false, or unknown, (in
other words, we model belief and doubt independently) we have 5:
P (F is true | G is true) = P (F is true)
P (F is true | G is false) = P (F is true)
P (F is false | G is true) = P (F is false)
P (F is false | G is false) = P (F is false)
(3)
Then the constraints characterizing independence is obtained by adding the follow-
ing equations to the system of constraints (2).
w11 = (w10 + w1⊥ + w11)× (w01 + w⊥1 + w11)
w10 = (w10 + w1⊥ + w11)× (w00 + w⊥0 + w10)
w01 = (w00 + w0⊥ + w01)× (w01 + w⊥1 + w11)
w00 = (w00 + w0⊥ + w01)× (w00 + w⊥0 + w10)
(4)
The belief in F ∧indG, and doubt in F ∨indG can be easily verified from the system
5 We have nine equations, but it can be shown that the other five are dependent on these four
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of constraints 2 and 4 6
α1 × α2 ≤ w11 ≤ β1 × β2
γ1 × γ2 ≤ w00 ≤ δ1 × δ2
(5)
To obtain the doubt in F ∧ind G we need to compute the minimum and maximum
of w00 + w0⊥ + w01 + w10 + w⊥0. It is easy to verify that:
γ1 + γ2 − γ1 × γ2 ≤ w00 + w0⊥ + w01 + w10 + w⊥0 ≤ δ1 + δ2 − δ1 × δ2
The belief in F ∨ind G is obtained similarly (in the dual manner.) Thus, we have
verified that
conf (F ∧indG) = 〈[α1×α2, β1×β2], [1− (1−γ1)× (1−γ2), 1− (1− δ1)× (1− δ2)]〉.
conf (F ∨indG) = 〈[1− (1−α1)× (1−α2), 1− (1−β1)× (1−β2)], [γ1×γ2, δ1× δ2]〉.
Case 3: Positive Correlation:
Two events F and G are positively correlated if they overlap as much as possible.
This happens when either (i) occurrence of F implies occurrence of G, or (ii)
occurrence of G implies occurrence of F . In our framework we model belief and
doubt independently, and positive correlation is characterized by 4 possibilities:
(a) Occurrence of F implies occurrence of G, and non-occurrence of G implies non-
occurrence of F .
(b) Occurrence of F implies occurrence of G, and non-occurrence of F implies non-
occurrence of G.
(c) Occurrence of G implies occurrence of F , and non-occurrence of G implies non-
occurrence of F .
(d) Occurrence of G implies occurrence of F , and non-occurrence of F implies
non-occurrence of G.
Each of these four condition sets generates its own equations. For example, (a)
can be captured by adding the following equations to the system of constraints 2.
w1⊥ = 0
w10 = 0
w⊥0 = 0
(6)
Hence, for condition (a), the system of constraints 2 becomes
α1 ≤ w11 ≤ β1
γ1 ≤ w00 + w0⊥ + w01 ≤ δ1
α2 ≤ w01 + w⊥1 + w11 ≤ β2
γ2 ≤ w00 ≤ δ2
wij ≥ 0, i, j ∈ {1, 0,⊥}
Σi,jwij = 1
(7)
The analysis is further complicated by the fact that the confidence levels of
6 such duality results exist with respect to conjunction and disjunctions lower and upper bounds
(and vice versa).
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F and G determine which of these cases apply, and it may be different for the
lowerbound and upperbound probabilities. For example, if α1 > α2 (β1 > β2), then
the lowerbound (upperbound) for belief in F ∧pc G is obtained when occurrence of
F implies occurrence of G. Otherwise, these bounds are obtained when occurrence
of G implies occurrence of F .
The solution to these linear programs can be shown to be
conf (F ∧pc G) = 〈[min{α1, α2},min{β1, β2}], [max{γ1, γ2},max{δ1, δ2}]〉, and
conf (F ∨pc G) = 〈[max{α1, α2},max{β1, β2}], [min{γ1, γ2},min{δ1, δ2}]〉.
A more intuitive approach to the derivation of confidence levels for conjunction
and disjunction of positively correlated events is to rely on the observation that
these events overlap to the maximum extent possible. In our framework it means the
worlds where F is true and those where G is true overlap maximally, and hence, one
is included in the other. Similarly, since we model belief and doubt independently,
the worlds where F is false and those where G is false also overlap maximally. The
combination formulas can be derived directly using these observations.
Case 4: Negative Correlation:
Negative correlation is an appropriate mode to use whenever we know that events
F and G overlap as little as possible. This is to be contrasted with positive corre-
lation, where the extent of overlap is the greatest possible. Mutual exclusion, is a
special case of negative correlation where the sum of the probabilities of the two
events does not exceed 1. In this case the two events do not overlap at all.
In the classical framework, mutual exclusion of two events F and G is character-
ized by the statement: (i) occurrence of F implies non-occurrence of G, and vice
versa. On the other hand, if the two events F and G are negatively correlated but
not mutually exclusive, we have: (ii) non-occurrence of F implies occurrence of G,
and vice versa. In Case (i) the sum of the probabilities of the two events is at most
1, while in Case (ii) this sum exceeds 1 and hence the two events cannot be mu-
tually exclusive. In our framework we model belief and doubt independently, and
each of the above conditions translates to two conditions as follows. Note that in
our framework, “not true” means “false or unknown”, and “not false” means “true
or unknown”.
Case (i):
(a) Event F is true implies G is not true, and vice versa. This condition generates
the equation w11 = 0.
(b) The dual of condition (a), when the non-occurrence of the two events don’t
overlap. Event F is false implies G is not false, and vice versa. This condition
generates the equation w00 = 0.
Case (ii):
(c) Event F is not true implies G is true, and vice versa. This condition generates
the equations w00 = 0, w⊥0 = 0, w0⊥ = 0, and w⊥⊥ = 0.
(d) The dual of (c), F is not false impliesG is false, and vice versa, which generates
the equations w11 = 0, w⊥1 = 0, w1⊥ = 0, and w⊥⊥ = 0.
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Similar to the case for positive correlation, the confidence levels of F and G
determine which of these cases apply. For example, if α1 + α2 > 1, then case (c)
should be used to determine the lowerbound for belief in F ∧nc G.
Alternatively, and more intuitively, we can characterize negative correlation by
observing that the worlds where F is true and those where G is true overlap min-
imally, and the worlds where F is false and those where G is false also overlap
minimally. The confidences of F ∧ G and F ∨ G can be obtained using the equa-
tions, or directly from the alternative characterization:
conf (F ∧nc G) =
〈[max{0, α1 + α2 − 1},max{0, β1 + β2 − 1}], [min{1, γ1 + γ2},min{1, δ1 + δ2}]〉
conf (F ∨nc G) =
〈[min{1, α1 + α2},min{1, β1 + β2}], [max{0, γ1 + γ2 − 1},max{0, δ1 + δ2 − 1}]〉
Case 5: Mutual Exclusion:
Mutual exclusion is a special case of negative correlation. The main difference
is that it requires the sum of the two probabilities to be at most 1, which is not
necessarily the case for negative correlation (see the previous case). In the classical
framework, if two events are mutually exclusive, their negation are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Rather, they are negatively correlated. In our framework, how-
ever, one or both conditions (a) and (b), discussed in the previous case, can hold.
The appropriate condition is determined by the confidence levels of the two mutu-
ally exclusive events, and the corresponding combination formula can be obtained
from the combination formulas of negative correlation. The following formulas, for
example, are for mutually exclusive events F and G where α1 + α2 ≤ β1 + β2 ≤ 1
(but no other restriction).
conf (F ∧me G) = 〈[0, 0], [min{1, γ1 + γ2},min{1, δ1 + δ2}]〉.
conf (F ∨meG) = 〈[α1+α2, β1+β2], [max{0, γ1+ γ2− 1},max{0, δ1+ δ2− 1}]〉.
Next, we show that the combination formulas for various modes preserve consis-
tent as well as reduced confidence levels. The case for reduced confidence levels is
more involved and will be presented first. The other case is similar, for which we
only state the theorem.
Theorem 4.2
Suppose F and G are any formulas and assume their confidence levels are reduced
(Definition 4.3). Then the confidence levels of the formulas F ∧ G and F ∨ G,
obtained under the various modes above are all reduced.
Proof. Let conf (F ) = 〈[α1, β1], [γ1, δ1]〉 and conf (G) = 〈[α2, β2], [γ2, δ2]〉. Since
the confidence levels of F and G are reduced, we have:
0 ≤ αi ≤ βi ≤ 1
0 ≤ γi ≤ δi ≤ 1
αi + δi ≤ 1
βi + γi ≤ 1
The consistency of the confidence levels of the combination events F ∧G and F ∨G
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in different modes as derived in Theorem 4.1 follow from the above constraints. For
example let us consider
conf (A∧igB) = 〈[max{0, α1+α2−1},min{β1, β2}], [max{γ1, γ2},min{1, δ1+δ2}]〉
We need to show
(1) max{0, α1 + α2 − 1} ≤ min{β1, β2}
(2) max{γ1, γ2} ≤ min{1, δ1 + δ2}
(3) max{0, α1 + α2 − 1}+min{1, δ1 + δ2} ≤ 1
(4) min{β1, β2}+max{γ1, γ2} ≤ 1
To prove (1): If max{0, α1 + α2 − 1} = 0 then (1) holds. Otherwise, assume,
without loss of generality, that min{β1, β2} = β1. We can write
α1 ≤ β1
α2 ≤ 1
and hence
α1 + α2 ≤ β1 + 1
and (1) follows.
Inequality (2) follows easily from γi ≤ δi ≤ 1.
To prove (3): If max{0, α1 + α2 − 1} = 0 then (3) holds. Otherwise, we can write
α1 + δ1 ≤ 1
α2 + δ2 ≤ 1
and hence
α1 + α2 − 1 + δ1 + δ2 ≤ 1
and (3) follows. Note that if δ1 + δ2 > 1 then α1 + α2 − 1 + 1 ≤ 1 follows from the
above constraint.
To prove (4) let min{β1, β2} = βj and max(γ1, γ2} = γk where j, k ∈ {1, 2}. Then
βj + γk ≤ βk + γk ≤ 1.
Proving the consistency of the confidence levels of other combinations and other
modes are similar and will not be elaborated here.
Theorem 4.3
Suppose F and G are any formulas and assume their confidence levels are consistent
(Definition 4.2). Then the confidence levels of the formulas F∧G and F∨G, obtained
under the various modes above are all consistent.
Proof. Proof is similar to the previous theorem and is omitted.
5 Probabilistic Deductive Databases
In this section, we develop a framework for probabilistic deductive databases using
a language of probabilistic programs (p-programs). We make use of the probabilistic
calculus developed in Section 4 and develop the syntax and declarative semantics
for programming with confidence levels. We also provide the fixpoint semantics of
programs in this framework and establish its equivalence to the declarative seman-
tics. We will use the first-order language L of Section 4 as the underlying logical
language in this section.
20 Laks V. S. Lakshmanan and Fereidoon Sadri
Syntax of p-Programs: A rule is an expression of the form A
c
← B1, . . . , Bm,m ≥
0, where A,Bi are atoms and c ≡ 〈[α, β], [γ, δ]〉 is the confidence level associated
with the rule7. Whenm = 0, we call this a fact. All variables in the rule are assumed
to be universally quantified outside the whole rule, as usual. We restrict attention
to range restricted rules, as is customary. A probabilistic rule (p-rule) is a triple
(r; µr, µp), where r is a rule, µr is a mode indicating how to conjoin the confidence
levels of the subgoals in the body of r (and with that of r itself), and µp is a mode
indicating how the confidence levels of different derivations of an atom involving
the head predicate of r are to be disjoined. We say µr (µp) is the mode associated
with the body (head) of r, and call it the conjunctive (disjunctive) mode. We refer
to r as the underlying rule of this p-rule. When r is a fact, we omit µr for obvious
reasons. A probabilistic program (p-program) is a finite collection of p-rules such
that whenever there are p-rules whose underlying rules define the same predicate,
the mode associated with their head is identical. This last condition ensures different
rules defining the same predicate q agree on the manner in which confidences of
identical q-atoms generated by these rules are to be combined. The notions of
Herbrand universe HP and Herbrand base BP associated with a p-program P are
defined as usual. A p-rule is ground exactly when every atom in it is ground. The
Herbrand instantiation P ∗ of a p-program is defined in the obvious manner. The
following example illustrates our framework.
Example 5.1
People are assessed to be at high risk for various diseases, depending on factors such
as age group, family history (with respect to the disease), etc. Accordingly, high risk
patients are administered appropriate medications, which are prescribed by doctors
among several alternative ones. Medications cause side effects, sometimes harmful
ones, leading to other symptoms and diseases8. Here, the extent of risk, adminis-
tration of medications9, side effects (caused by medications), and prognosis are all
uncertain phenomena, and we associate confidence levels with them. The following
program is a sample of the uncertain knowledge related to these phenomena.
1. (high-risk(X,D)
〈[0.65,0.65],[0.1,0.1]〉
< midaged(X), family-history(X,D); ind, ).
2. (takes(X,M)
〈[0.40,0.40],[0,0]〉
< high-risk(X,D), medication(D,M); ign, ).
3. (prognosis(X,D)
〈[0.70,0.70],[0.12,0.12]〉
< high-risk(X,D); ign, pc).
4. (prognosis(X,D)
〈[0.20,0.20],[0.70,0.70]〉
< takes(X,M), side-effects(M,D); ind, pc).
We can assume an appropriate set of facts (the EDB) in conjunction with the
above program. For rule 1, it is easy to see that each ground atom involving the
predicate high-risk has at most one derivation. Thus, a disjunctive mode for this
7 We assume only consistent confidence levels henceforth (see Section 4).
8 Recent studies on the effects of certain medications on high risk patients for breast cancer
provide one example of this.
9 Uncertainty in this is mainly caused by the choices available and the fact that even under
identical conditions doctors need not prescribe the same drug. The probabilities here can be
derived from statistical data on the relative frequency of prescriptions of drugs under given
conditions.
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rule will be clearly redundant, and we have suppressed it for convenience. A similar
remark holds for rule 2. Rule 1 says that if a person is midaged and the disease
D has struck his ancestors, then the confidence level in the person being at high
risk for D is given by propagating the confidence levels of the body subgoals and
combining them with the rule confidence in the sense of ∧ind. This could be based
on an expert’s belief that the factors midaged and family-history contributing
to high risk for the disease are independent. Each of the other rules has a similar
explanation. For the last rule, we note that the potential of a medication to cause
side effects is an intrinsic property independent of whether one takes the medication.
Thus the conjunctive mode used there is independence. Finally, note that rules 3 and
4, defining prognosis, use positive correlation as a conservative way of combining
confidences obtained from different derivations. For simplicity, we show each interval
in the above rules as a point probability. Still, note that the confidences for atoms
derived from the program will be genuine intervals.
A Valuation Based Semantics: We develop the declarative semantics of p-
programs based on the notion of valuations. Let P be a p-program. A probabilistic
valuation is a function v : BP→Lc which associates a confidence level with each
ground atom in BP . We define the satisfaction of p-programs under valuations, with
respect to the truth order ≤t of the trilattice (see Section 4)
10. We say a valuation v
satisfies a ground p-rule ρ ≡ (A
c
← B1, . . . , Bm; µr, µp), denoted |=v ρ, provided
c∧µrv(B1)∧µr · · · ∧µr v(Bm) ≤t v(A). The intended meaning is that in order to
satisfy this p-rule, v must assign a confidence level to A that is no less true (in the
sense of ≤t) than the result of the conjunction of the confidences assigned to Bi’s
by v and the rule confidence c, in the sense of the mode µr. Even when a valuation
satisfies (all ground instances of) each rule in a p-program, it may not satisfy the
p-program as a whole. The reason is that confidences coming from different deriva-
tions of atoms are combined strengthening the overall confidence. Thus, we need to
impose the following additional requirement.
Let ρ ≡ (r ≡ A
c
← B1, . . . , Bm; µr, µp) be a ground p-rule, and v a valuation.
Then we denote by rule-conf(A, ρ, v) the confidence level propagated to the head
of this rule under the valuation v and the rule mode µr, given by the expression
c∧µrv(B1)∧µr · · · ∧µrv(Bm). Let P
∗ = P ∗1 ∪· · ·∪P
∗
k be the partition of P
∗ such that
(i) each P ∗i contains all (ground) p-rules which define the same atom, say Ai, and
(ii) Ai and Aj are distinct, whenever i 6= j. Suppose µi is the mode associated with
the head of the p-rules in P ∗i . We denote by atom-conf(Ai, P, v) the confidence level
determined for the atom Ai under the valuation v using the program P . This is given
by the expression ∨µi{rule-conf(Ai, ρ, v)|ρ ∈ Pi∗}. We now define satisfaction of
p-programs.
Definition 5.1
Let P be a p-program and v a valuation. Then v satisfies P , denoted |=v P exactly
10 Satisfaction can be defined with respect to each of the 3 orders of the trilattice, giving rise to
different interesting semantics. Their discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
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when v satisfies each (ground) p-rule in P ∗, and for all atoms A ∈ BP , atom-
conf(A,P, v) ≤t v(A).
The additional requirement ensures the valuation assigns a strong enough confi-
dence to each atom so it will support the combination of confidences coming from
a number of rules (pertaining to this atom). A p-program P logically implies a p-
fact A
c
←, denoted P |= A
c
←, provided every valuation satisfying P also satisfies
A
c
←. We next have
Proposition 5.1
Let v be a valuation and P a p-program. Suppose the mode associated with the
head of each p-rule in P is positive correlation. Then |=v P iff v satisfies each rule
in P ∗.
Proof. We shall show that if rule-conf(A, ρi, v) ≤t v(A) for all rules ρi defining a
ground atom A, then atom-conf(A,P, v) ≤t v(A), where the disjunctive mode for A
is positive correlation. This follows from the formula for ∨pc, obtained in Theorem
4.1. It is easy to see that c1 ∨pc c2 = c1⊕tc2. But then, rule-conf(A, ρi, v) ≤t
v(A) implies that⊕t{rule-conf(A, ρi, v)} ≤t v(A) and hence atom-conf(A,P, v) ≤t
v(A).
The above proposition shows that when positive correlation is the only disjunctive
mode used, satisfaction is very similar to the classical case.
For the declarative semantics of p-programs, we need something like the “least”
valuation satisfying the program. It is straightforward to show that the class of
all valuations Υ from BP to Lc itself forms a trilattice, complete with all the
3 orders and the associated meets and joins. They are obtained by a pointwise
extension of the corresponding order/operation on the trilattice Lc. We give one
example. For valuations u, v, u ≤t v iff ∀A ∈ BP , u(A) ≤t v(A); ∀A ∈ BP ,
(u⊗tv)(A) = u(A)⊗tv(A). One could investigate “least” with respect to each of
the 3 orders of the trilattice. In this paper, we confine attention to the order ≤t.
The least (greatest) valuation is then the valuation false (true) which assigns the
confidence level ⊥t (⊤t) to every ground atom. We now have
Lemma 5.1
Let P be any p-program and u, v be any valuations satisfying P . Then u⊗tv is
also a valuation satisfying P . In particular, ⊗t{v | |=v P} is the least valuation
satisfying P .
Proof. We prove this in two steps. First, we show that for any ground p-rule
ρ ≡ (r ≡ A
c
← B1, . . . , Bm; µr, µp)
whenever valuations u and v satisfy ρ, so does u⊗tv. Secondly, we shall show that for
a p-program P , whenever atom-conf (A,P, u) ≤t u(A) and atom-conf (A,P, v) ≤t
v(A), then we also have atom-conf (A,P, u⊗tv) ≤t u⊗tv(A). The lemma will follow
from this.
(1) Suppose u |= ρ and v |= ρ. We prove the case where the conjunctive mode µr as-
sociated with this rule is ignorance. The other cases are similar. It is straightforward
to verify the following.
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(i) u⊗tv(B1) ∧ig · · · ∧ig u⊗tv(Bm) ≤t u(B1) ∧ig · · · ∧ig u(Bm) ≤t u(A).
(ii) u⊗tv(B1) ∧ig · · · ∧ig u⊗tv(Bm) ≤t v(B1) ∧ig · · · ∧ig v(Bm) ≤t v(A).
From (i) and (ii), we have u⊗tv(B1) ∧ig · · · ∧ig u⊗tv(Bm) ≤t u⊗tv(A), showing
u⊗tv |= ρ.
(2) Suppose u, v are any two valuations satisfying a p-program P . Let ρ1, . . . , ρn be
the set of all ground p-rules in P ∗ whose heads are A. Let ci = rule-conf (A, ρi, u)
and di = rule-conf (A, ρi, v). Since u |= P and v |= P , we have that ∨µp(ci | 1 ≤
i ≤ n) ≤t u(A) and ∨µp(di | 1 ≤ i ≤ n) ≤t v(A), where µp is the disjunctive
mode associated with A. Again, we give the proof for the case µp is ignorance as
the other cases are similar. Let ei = rule-conf (A, ρi, u⊗tv), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Clearly,
ei ≤t ci and ei ≤t di. Thus, ∨µp(ei | 1 ≤ i ≤ n) ≤t ∨µp(ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n) ≤t u(A)
and ∨µp(ei | 1 ≤ i ≤ n) ≤t ∨µp(di | 1 ≤ i ≤ n) ≤t v(A). It then follows that
∨µp(ei | 1 ≤ i ≤ n) ≤t u(A)⊗tv(A) = u⊗tv(A), which was to be shown.
We take the least valuation satisfying a p-program as characterizing its declara-
tive semantics.
Example 5.2
Consider the following p-program P .
1. (A
〈[0.5,0.7], [0.3,0.45]〉
< B; ind, pc). 2. (A
〈[0.6,0.8], [0.1,0.2]〉
< C; ign, pc).
3. (B
〈[0.9,0.95], [0,0.1]〉
< ; , ind). 4. (C
〈[0.7,0.8], [0.1,0.2]〉
< ; , ind).
In the following we show three valuations v1, v2, v3, of which v1 and v3 satisfy P ,
while v2 does not. In fact, v3 is the least valuation satisfying P .
val B C A
v1 〈[0.9, 1], [0, 0]〉 〈[0.8, 0.9], [0.05, 0.1]〉 〈[0.5, 0.9], [0, 0]〉
v2 〈[0.9, 1], [0, 0]〉 〈[0.9, 1], [0, 0]〉 〈[0.5, 0.7], [0.1, 0.4]〉
v3 〈[0.9, 0.95], [0, 0.1]〉 〈[0.7, 0.8], [0.1, 0.2]〉 〈[0.45, 0.8], [0.1, 0.4]〉
For example, consider v1. It is easy to verify that v1 satisfies P . Rules 1 through
4 are satisfied by v1 since:
〈[0.5, 0.7], [0.3, 0.45]〉 ∧ind 〈[0.9, 1], [0, 0]〉 = 〈[0.45, 0.7], [0, 0]〉 ≤t 〈[0.5, 0.9], [0, 0]〉
〈[0.6, 0.8], [0.1, 0.2]〉 ∧ign 〈[0.8, 0.9], [0.05, 0.1]〉 =
〈[0.4, 0.8], [0.1, 0.3]〉 ≤t 〈[0.5, 0.9], [0, 0]〉
〈[0.9, 0.95], [0, 0.1]〉 ≤t 〈[0.9, 1], [0, 0]〉
〈[0.7, 0.8], [0.1, 0.2]〉 ≤t 〈[0.8, 0.9], [0.05, 0.1]〉
Further, the confidence level of A computed by the combination of rules 1 and 2
is also satisfied by v1, namely,
(〈[0.5, 0.7], [0.3, 0.45]〉 ∧ind 〈[0.9, 1], [0, 0]〉) ∨pc (〈[0.6, 0.8], [0.1, 0.2]〉
∧ign〈[0.8, 0.9], [0.05, 0.1]〉) = 〈[0.45, 0.8], [0, 0] ≤t 〈[0.5, 0.9], [0, 0]〉
Fixpoint Semantics:We associate an “immediate consequence” operator TP with
a p-program P , defined as follows.
Definition 5.2
Let P be a p-program and P ∗ its Herbrand instantiation. Then TP is a function
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TP : Υ→Υ, defined as follows. For any probabilistic valuation v, and any ground
atomA ∈ BP , TP (v)(A) = ∨µp{cA| there exists a p-rule (A
c
← B1, . . . , Bm, µr, µp) ∈
P ∗, such that cA = c∧µrv(B1)∧µr · · · ∧µrv(Bm)}.
Call a valuation v consistent provided for every atom A, v(A) is consistent, as
defined in Section 3.
Theorem 5.1
(1) TP always maps consistent valuations to consistent valuations. (2) TP is mono-
tone and continuous.
Proof. (1) This fact follows Theorem 4.3, where we have shown that the combina-
tion functions for all modes map consistent confidence levels to consistent confidence
levels. (2) This follows from the fact that the combination functions for all modes
are themselves monotone and continuous.
We define bottom-up iterations based on TP in the usual manner.
TP ↑ 0 = false (which assigns the truth-value ⊥t to every ground atom).
TP ↑ α = TP (TP ↑ α− 1), for a successor ordinal α.
TP ↑ α = ⊕t{TP ↑ β|β < α}, for a limit ordinal α.
We have the following results.
Proposition 5.2
Let v be any valuation and P be a p-program. Then v satisfies P iff TP (v) ≤t v.
Proof. (only if). If v satisfies P , then by Definition 5.1, for all atoms A ∈ BP ,
atom-conf(A,P, v) ≤t v(A) and hence TP (v) ≤t v.
(if). If TP (v) ≤t v, then by the definition of TP (Definition 5.2) for all atoms
A ∈ BP , atom-conf(A,P, v) ≤t v(A) and hence v satisfies P .
The following theorem is the analogue of the van Emden-Kowalski theorem for
classical logic programming.
Theorem 5.2
Let P be a p-program. Then the following claims hold.
(i) lfp(TP ) = ⊗t{v| |=v P} = the ≤t-least valuation satisfying P .
(ii) For a ground atom A, lfp(TP )(A) = c iff P |= A
c
←.
Proof. Follows Lemma 5.1, Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 5.2. Proof is similar to
the analogous theorem of logic programming and details are omitted.
6 Proof Theory
Since confidences coming from different derivations of a fact are combined, we
need a notion of disjunctive proof-trees. We note that the notions of substitution,
unification, etc. are analogous to the classical ones. A variable appearing in a rule
is local if it only appears in its body.
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Definition 6.1
Let G be a(n atomic) goal and P a p-program. Then a disjunctive proof-tree (DPT)
for G with respect to P is a tree T defined as follows.
1. T has two kinds of nodes: rule nodes and goal nodes. Each rule node is labeled
by a rule in P and a substitution. Each goal node is labeled by an atomic goal. The
root is a goal node labeled G.
2. Let u be a goal node labeled by an atom A. Then every child (if any) of u is a
rule node labeled (r, θ), where r is a rule in P whose head is unifiable with A using
the mgu θ. We assume that each time a rule r appears in the tree, its variables are
renamed to new variables that do not appear anywhere else in the tree. Hence r in
the label (r, θ) actually represents a renamed instance of the rule.
3. If u is a rule node labeled (r, θ), then whenever an atom B occurs in the body
of r′ = rθ, u has a goal child v labeled B.
4. For any two substitutions pi, θ occurring in T , pi(V ) = θ(V ), for every variable
V . In other words, all substitutions occurring in T are compatible.
A node without children is called a leaf. A proper DPT is a finite DPT T such
that whenever T has a goal leaf labeled A, there is no rule in P whose head is
unifiable with A. We only consider proper DPTs unless otherwise specified. A rule
leaf is a success node (represents a database fact) while a goal leaf is a failure node.
Remarks:
(1) The definition of disjunctive proof tree captures the idea that when working
with uncertain information in the form of probabilistic rules and facts, we need
to consider the disjunction of all proofs in order to determine the best possible
confidence in the goal being proved.
(2) However, notice that the definition does not insist that a goal node A should
have rule children corresponding to all possible unifiable rules and mgu’s.
(3) We assume without loss of generality that all rules in the p-program are stan-
dardized apart by variable renaming so they share no common variables.
(4) A goal node can have several rule children corresponding to the same rule. That
is, a goal node can have children labeled (r, θ1), . . . , (r, θn), where r is (a renamed
version of) a rule in the program. But we require that r′i = rθi, i = 1, . . . , n, be
distinct.
(5) We require all substitutions in the tree to be compatible. The convention ex-
plained above ensures there will be no conflict among them on account of common
variables across rules (or different invocations of the same rule).
(6) Note that a DPT can be finite or infinite.
(7) In a proper DPT, goal leaves are necessarily failure nodes; this is not true in
non-proper DPTs.
(8) A proper DPT with no failure nodes has only rule leaves, hence, it has an odd
height.
Confidences are associated with (finite) DPTs as follows.
Definition 6.2
Let P be a p-program, G a goal, and T any finite DPT for G with respect to P .
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We associate confidences with the nodes of T as follows.
1. Each failure node gets the confidence 〈[0, 0], [1, 1]〉, the false confidence level
with respect to truth ordering, ⊥t (see Section 3). Each success node labeled (r, θ),
where r is a rule in P , and c is the confidence of rule r, gets the confidence c.
2. Suppose u is a rule node labeled (r, θ), such that the confidence of r is c, its
(conjunctive) mode is µr, and the confidences of the children of u are c1, . . . , cm.
Then u gets the confidence c∧µrc1∧µr · · · ∧µr cm.
3. Suppose u is a goal node labeled A, with a (disjunctive) mode µp such that the
confidences of its children are c1, . . . , ck. Then u gets the confidence c1∨µp · · · ∨µpck.
We recall the notions of identity and annihilator from algebra (e.g. see Ullman
(Ullman, 1989)). Let c ∈ Lc be any element of the confidence lattice and ⊙ be any
operation of the form ∧µ or of the form ∨µ, µ being any of the modes discussed in
Section 4. Then c is an identity with respect to ⊙, if ∀d ∈ Lc, c⊙ d = d⊙ c = d.
It is an annihilator with respect to ⊙, if ∀d ∈ Lc, c⊙ d = d ⊙ c = c. The proof
of the following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 6.1
The truth-value ⊥t = 〈[0, 0], [1, 1]〉 is an identity with respect to disjunction and an
annihilator with respect to conjunction. The truth-value ⊤t = 〈[1, 1], [0, 0]〉 is an
identity with respect to conjunction and an annihilator with respect to disjunction.
These claims hold for all modes discussed in Section 4.
In view of this proposition, we can consider only DPTs without failure nodes
without losing any generality.
We now proceed to prove the soundness and completeness theorems. First, we
need some definitions.
Definition 6.3
A branch B of a DPT T is a set of nodes of T , defined as follows. The root of T
belongs to B. Whenever a goal node is in B, exactly one of its rule children (if
any) belongs to B. Finally, whenever a rule node belongs to B, all its goal children
belong to B. We extend this definition to the subtrees of a DPT in the obvious way.
A subbranch of T rooted at a goal node G is the branch of the subtree of T rooted
at G.
We can associate a substitution with a (sub)branch B as follows. (1) The substi-
tution associated with a success node labeled (r, θ) is just θ. (2) The substitution
associated with an internal goal node is simply the substitution associated with its
unique rule child in B. (3) The substitution associated with an internal rule node u
in B which is labeled (r, θ) is the composition of θ and the substitutions associated
with the goal children of u.
The substitution associated with a branch is that associated with its root.
We say a DPT T is well-formed if it satisfies the following conditions: (i) T is
proper, (ii) For every goal node G in T , for any two (sub)branches B1, B2 of T
rooted at G, the substitutions associated with B1 and B2 are distinct.
The second condition ensures no two branches correspond to the same classical
“proof” of the goal or a sub-goal. Without this condition, since the probabilistic
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conjunctions and disjunctions are not idempotent, the confidence of the same proof
could be wrongly combined giving an incorrect confidence for the (root of the) DPT.
Henceforth, we will only consider well-formed DPTs, namely, DPTs that are
proper, have no failure nodes, and have distinct substitutions for all (sub) branches
corresponding to a goal node, for all goal nodes.
Theorem 6.1 (Soundness)
Let P be a p-program and G a (ground) goal. If there is a finite well-formed DPT
for G with respect to P with an associated confidence c at its root, then c ≤t
lfp(TP )(G).
Proof. First, we make the following observations regarding the combination func-
tions of Theorem 4.1:
(1) Conjunctive combination functions (all modes) are monotone.
(2) Disjunctive combination functions (all modes) are monotone.
(3) If F and G are confidence levels, then conf (F ∧µG) ≤t conf (F ) and conf (F ) ≤t
conf (F ∨µG) for all conjunctive and disjunctive combination functions (all modes).
We prove the soundness theorem by induction on the height of the DPT. Assume
the well-formed DPT T of height h is for the goal G. Note that T has an odd height,
h = 2k − 1 for some k ≥ 1, since it is a proper DPT with no failure nodes (see
Remark 7 at the beginning of this section).
Basis: k = 1. In this case the DPT consists of the goal root labeled G and one
child labeled (r, θ), where r is a rule in P whose head is unifiable with G. Note
that this child node is a success leaf. i.e. it represents a fact. Obviously, in the first
iteration of TP , conf (G) = cr, where cr is the confidence level of r. It follows from
the monotonicity of TP , that c = cr ≤t lfp(TP )(G).
Induction: k > 1. Assume the inductive hypothesis holds for every DPT of height
h′ = 2k′−1, where k′ < k. Consider the DPT T for G. The root G has rule children
Ri labeled (ri, θi). Each Ri is either a fact, or has goal children Gi1 , . . . , Gini .
Consider the subtrees of T rooted at these goal grand children ofG. By the inductive
hypothesis, the confidence levels cij associated with the goal grand children Gij
by the DPT are less than or equal to their confidence levels calculated by TP ,
i.e. , cij ≤t lfp(TP )(Gij ). Hence, by properties (1)-(3) above, the confidence level
associated to G by T is less than or equal to the confidence level of G obtained
by another application of TP , c ≤t TP (lfp(TP ))(G). Hence c ≤t lfp(TP )(G). Note
that T must be well-formed otherwise this argument is not valid.
Theorem 6.2 (Completeness)
Let P be a p-program and G a goal such that for some number k < ω, lfp(TP )(G) =
TP ↑ k(G). Then there is a finite DPT T for G with respect to P with an associated
confidence c at its root, such that lfp(TP )(G) ≤t c.
Proof. Let k be the smallest number such that TP ↑ k(G) = lfp(TP )(G). We shall
show by induction on k that there is a DPT T for G with respect to P such that
the confidence computed by it is at least lfp(TP )(G).
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Basis: k = 0. This implies lfp(TP )(G) = 〈[0, 0], [1, 1]〉. This case is trivial. The
DPT consists of a failure node labeled G.
Induction: Suppose the result holds for a certain number n. We show that it also
holds for n + 1. Suppose A is a ground atom such that lfp(TP )(A) = c = TP ↑
n+ 1(A). Now, TP ↑ n+ 1(A) = ∨µp {cr ∧µr TP ↑ n(B1) ∧µr · · · ∧µr TP ↑ n(Bm)|
There exists a rule r such that µr is the mode associated with its body, and µp is
the mode associated with its head, and there exists a ground substitution θ such
that rθ ≡ A
cr←B1, . . . , Bm}.
Consider the DPT for A obtained as follows. Let the root be labeled A. The root
has a rule child corresponding to each rule instance used in the above computation of
TP ↑ n+1(A). Let v be a rule child created at this step, and suppose A
cr←B1, . . . , Bm
is the rule instance corresponding to it and let θ be the substitution used to unify
the head of the original rule with the atom A. Then v hasm goal children with labels
B1, . . . , Bm respectively. Finally, by induction hypothesis, we can assume that (i)
a DPT for Bi is rooted at the node labeled Bi, and (ii) the confidence computed
by this latter tree is at least lfp(TP )(Bi) = TP ↑ n(Bi), 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In this case,
it readily follows from the definition of the confidence computed by a proof-tree
that the confidence computed by T is at least ∨µp {cr ∧µr conf(body(r))|r is a rule
defining A, cr is the confidence associated with it, µr is the mode associated with
its head, and µp is the mode associated with its body}.
But this confidence is exactly TP ↑ n+ 1(A). The induction is complete and the
theorem follows.
Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 together show that the confidence of an arbitrary ground
atom computed according to the fixpoint semantics and using an appropriate dis-
junctive proof tree is the same. This in turn is the same as the confidence associ-
ated according to the (valuation based) declarative semantics. In particular, as we
will discuss in Section 7, when the disjunctive mode associated with all recursive
predicates is positive correlation, the theorems guarantee that the exact confidence
associated with the goal can be effectively computed by constructing an appropri-
ate finite DPT (according to Theorem 6.2) for it. Even when these modes are used
indiscriminately, we can still obtain the confidence associated with the goal with an
arbitrarily high degree of accuracy, by constructing DPTs of appropriate height.
7 Termination and Complexity
In this section, we first compare our work with that of Ng and Subrahmanian
(Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992; Ng & Subrahmanian, 1993) (see Section 1 for a gen-
eral comparison with non-probabilistic frameworks). First, let us examine the (only)
“mode” for disjunction used by them11. They combine the confidences of an atom
A coming from different derivations by taking their intersection. Indeed, the bot-
tom of their lattice is a valuation (called “formula function” there) that assigns the
11 Their framework allows an infinite class of “conjunctive modes”. Also, recall they represent only
beliefs.
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interval [0, 1] to every atom. From the trilattice structure, it is clear that (i) their
bottom corresponds to ⊥p, and (ii) their disjunctive mode corresponds to ⊕p.
Example 7.1
r1: p(X,Y ) : [V1 × V3, V2 × V4]←e(X,Z) : [V1, V2], p(Z, Y ) : [V3, V4].
r2: p(X,Y ) : [V1, V2]←e(X,Y ) : [V1, V2].
r3: e(1, 2) : [1, 1].
r4: e(1, 3) : [1, 1].
r5: e(3, 2) : [0.9, 0.9].
This is a pf-program in the framework of Ng and Subrahmanian (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1993).
In a pf-rule each literal is annotated by an interval representing the lower-bound
and upper-bound of belief12. Variables can appear in the annotations, and the an-
notation of the head predicate is usually a function of body literals annotations.
The program in this example is basically the transitive closure program, with inde-
pendence as the conjunctive mode in the first rule. The disjunctive function for the
p predicate, as explained above, is interval intersection. Let us denote the operator
TP defined by them as T
NS
P for distinguishing it from ours. It is not hard to see
that this program is inconsistent in their framework, and lfp(TNSP )would assign an
empty probability range for p(1, 2). This is due to the existence of two derivations
for p(1, 2), with non-overlapping intervals. This is quite unintuitive. Indeed, there
is a definite path (with probability 1) corresponding to the edge e(1, 2). One may
wonder whether it makes sense to compare this approach with ours on an example
program which is inconsistent according to their semantics. The point is that in this
example, there is a certain path with probability [1,1] from 1 to 2, and an approach
that regards this program as inconsistent is not quite intuitive.
Now, consider the p-program corresponding to the annotated program {r1, . . . ,
r5}, obtained by stripping off atom annotations in r1, r2 and shifting the annotations
in r3, . . . , r5 to the associated rules. Also, associate the confidence level 〈[1, 1], [0, 0]〉
with r1, r2. For uniformity and ease of comparison, assume the doubt ranges are
all [0, 0]. As an example, let the conjunctive mode used in r1, r2 be independence
and let the disjunctive mode used be positive correlation (or, in this case, even
ignorance!). Then lfp(TP ) would assign the confidence 〈[1, 1], [0, 0]〉 to p(1, 2),
which agrees with our intuition. Our point, however, is not that intersection is
a “wrong” mode. Rather, we stress that different combination rules (modes) are
appropriate for different situations.
Example 7.2
Now consider the following pf-program (r1 and r2 are the same as previous exam-
ple):
r1: p(X,Y ) : [V1 × V3, V2 × V4]←e(X,Z) : [V1, V2], p(Z, Y ) : [V3, V4].
r2: p(X,Y ) : [V1, V2]←e(X,Y ) : [V1, V2].
r6: e(1, 2) : [0, 1].
r7: e(1, 1) : [0, 0.9].
12 To be precise, each basic formula, which is a conjunction or a disjunction of atoms, is annotated.
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In this case, the least fixpoint of TNSP is only attained at ω and it assigns the
range [0, 0] to p(1, 1) and p(1, 2). Again, the result is unintuitive for this example.
Since TNSP is not continuous, one can easily write programs such that no reasonable
approximation to lfp(TNSP ) can be obtained by iterating T
NS
P an arbitrary (finite)
number of times. (E.g. , consider the program obtained by adding the rule r8:
q(X,Y ) : [1, 1] ← p(X,Y ) : [0, 0] to {r1, r2, r6, r7}.) Notice that as long as one
uses any arithmetic annotation function such that the probability of the head is
less than the probability of the subgoals of r1 (which is a reasonable annotation
function), this problem will arise. The problem (for the unintuitive behavior) lies
with the mode for disjunction. Again, we emphasize that different combination rules
(modes) are appropriate for different situations.
Now, consider the p-program corresponding to the annotated program {r1, r2, r6, r7},
obtained in the same way as was done in Example 7.1. Let the conjunctive mode
used in r1, r2 be independence and let the disjunctive mode be positive correla-
tion or ignorance. Then lfp(TP ) would assign the confidence level 〈[0, 1] [0, 0]〉 to
p(1, 2). This again agrees with our intuition. As a last example, suppose we start
with the confidence 〈[0, 0.1], [0, 0]〉 for e(1, 2) instead. Then under positive corre-
lation (for disjunction) lfp(TP )(p(1, 2)) = 〈[0, 0.1], [0, 0]〉, while ignorance leads to
lfp(TP )(p(1, 2)) = 〈[0, 1], [0, 0]〉. The former makes more intuitive sense, although
the latter (more conservative under ≤p) is obviously not wrong. Also, in the latter
case, the lfp is reached only at ω.
Now, we discuss termination and complexity issues of p-programs. Let the closure
ordinal of TP be the smallest ordinal α such that TP ↑ α = lfp(TP ). We have the
following
Fact 7.1
Let P be any p-program. Then the closure ordinal of TP can be as high as ω but
no more.
Proof. The last p-program discussed in Example 7.2 has a closure ordinal of ω.
Since TP is continuous (Theorem 5.1) its closure ordinal is at most ω.
Definition 7.1
(Data Complexity) We define the data complexity (Vardi, M.Y., 1985) of a p-program
P as the time complexity of computing the least fixpoint of TP as a function of the
size of the database, i.e. the number of constants occurring in P 13.
It is well known that the data complexity for datalog programs is polynomial.
An important question concerning any extension of DDBs to handle uncertainty is
whether the data complexity is increased compared to datalog. We can show that
under suitable restrictions (see below) the data complexity of p-programs is poly-
nomial time. However, the proof cannot be obtained by (straightforward extensions
of) the classical argument for the data complexity for datalog. In the classical case,
13 With many rule-based systems with uncertainty, we cannot always separate EDB and IDB
predicates, which explains this slightly modified definition of data complexity.
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once a ground atom is derived during bottom-up evaluation, future derivations of
it can be ignored. In programming with uncertainty, complications arise because
we cannot ignore alternate derivations of the same atom: the confidences obtained
from them need to be combined, reinforcing the overall confidence of the atom. This
calls for a new proof technique. Our technique makes use of the following additional
notions.
Define a disjunctive derivation tree (DDT) to be a well-formed DPT (see Section
6 for a definition) such that every goal and every substitution labeling any node
in the tree is ground. Note that the height of a DDT with no failure nodes is an
odd number (see Remark 7 at the beginning of Section 6). We have the following
results.
Proposition 7.1
Let P be a p-program and A any ground atom in BP . Suppose the confidence
determined for A in iteration k ≥ 1 of bottom-up evaluation is c. Then there exists
a DDT T of height 2k − 1 for A such that the confidence associated with A by T
is exactly c.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k.
Basis: k = 1. In iteration 1, bottom-up evaluation essentially collects together
all edb facts (involving ground atoms) and determines their confidences from the
program. Without loss of generality, we may suppose there is at most one edb fact
in P corresponding to each ground atom (involving an edb predicate). Let A be any
ground atom whose confidence is determined to be c in iteration 1. Then there is an
edb fact r : A
c
← in P . The associated DDT for A corresponding to this iteration
is the tree with root labeled A and a rule child labeled r. Clearly, the confidence
associated with the root of this tree is c, and the height of this tree is 1 ( = 2k− 1,
for k = 1).
Induction: Assume the result for all ground atoms whose confidences are determined
(possibly revised) in iteration k. Suppose A is a ground atom whose confidence is
determined to be c in iteration k + 1. This implies there exist ground instances of
rules r1 : A
cr1←B1, . . . , Bm; µ1, µA, · · ·; rk : A
crk←C1, . . . , Cn; µk, µA such that (i)
the confidence of Bi , . . . , Cj computed at the end of iteration k is ci (, . . . , dj),
and (ii) c = (cr1∧µ1 (
∧
µ1 {c1, . . . , cm}) ∨µA · · · ∨µA (crk ∧µk (
∧
µk {d1, . . . , dn}),
where ∨µA is the disjunctive mode for the predicate A. By induction hypothe-
sis, there are DDTs TB1 , . . . , TBm , . . . , TC1, . . . , TCn , each of height 2k − 1 or less,
for the atoms B1, . . . , Bm, . . . , C1, . . . , Cn which exactly compute the confidences
c1, . . . , cm, . . . , d1, . . . , dn respectively, corresponding to iteration k. Consider the
tree Tk+1 for A by (i) making r1, . . . , rk rule children of the root and (ii) making the
TB1 , . . . , TBm , (, . . . , TC1, . . . , TCn) subtrees of r1 (, . . . , rk). It is trivial to see that
Tk+1 is a DDT for A and its height is 2+2k−1 = 2(k+1)−1. Further the confidence
Tk+1 computes for the root A is exactly (cr1∧µ1 (
∧
µ1 {c1, . . . , cm}) ∨µA · · · ∨µA
(crk ∧µk (
∧
µk {d1, . . . , dn}). This completes the induction and the proof.
Proposition 7.1 shows each iteration of bottom-up evaluation corresponds in an
essential manner to the construction of a set of DDTs one for each distinct ground
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atom whose confidence is determined (or revised) in that iteration. Our next ob-
jective is to establish a termination bound on bottom-up evaluation.
Definition 7.2 (Branches in DDTs)
DDT branches are defined similar to those of DPT. Let T be a DDT. Then a branch
of T is a subtree of T , defined as follows.
(i) The root belongs to every branch.
(ii) whenever a goal node belongs to a branch, exactly one of its rule children,
belongs to the branch.
(iii) whenever a rule node belongs to a branch, all its goal children belong to the
branch.
Definition 7.3 (Simple DDTs)
Let A be a ground atom and T any DDT (not necessarily for A). Then T is A-non-
simple provided it has a branch containing two goal nodes u and v such that u is
an ancestor of v and both are labeled by atom A. A DDT is A-simple if it is not
A-non-simple. Finally, a DDT is simple if it is A-simple for every atom A.
Let T be a DDT and Bi be a branch of T in which an atom A appears. Then we
define the number of violations of simplicity of Bi with respect to A to be one less
than the total number of times the atom A occurs in Bi. The number of violations
of the simplicity of the DDT T with respect to A is the sum of the number of
violations of the branches of T in which A occurs. Clearly, T is A-simple exactly
when the number of violations with respect to A is 0. Our first major result of this
section follows.
Theorem 7.1
Let P be a p-program such that only positive correlation is used as the disjunctive
mode for recursive predicates. Let max{height(TA) |A∈ BP , and TA is any simple
DDT for A} = 2k − 1, k ≥ 1. Then at most k + 1 iterations of naive bottom-up
evaluation are needed to compute the least fixpoint of TP .
Essentially, for p-programs P satisfying the conditions mentioned above, the the-
orem (i) shows that naive bottom-up evaluation of P is guaranteed to terminate,
and (ii) establishes an upper bound on the number of iterations of bottom-up eval-
uation for computing the least fixpoint, in terms of the maximum height of any
simple tree for any ground atom. This is the first step in showing that p-programs
of this type have a polynomial time data complexity. We will use the next three
lemmas (Lemmas 7.1–7.3) in proving this theorem.
Lemma 7.1
Let A ∈ BP be any ground atom, and let T be a DDT for A corresponding to
TP ↑ l, for some l. Suppose T is B-non-simple, for some atom B. Then there is a
DDT T ′ for A with the following properties:
(i) the certainty of A computed by T ′ equals that computed by T .
(ii) the number of violations of simplicity of T ′ with respect to B is less than that
of T .
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Proof. Let T be the DDT described in the hypothesis of the claim. Let A be the
label of the root u of T , and assume without loss of generality that B is identical
to A. (The case when B is distinct from A is similar.) Let v be the last goal node
from the root down (e.g. in the level-order), which is distinct from the root and is
labeled by A. Since T corresponds to applications of the TP operator, we have the
following.
(*) Every branch of v must be isomorphic to some branch of u which does not
contain the node v.
This can be seen as follows. Let p < l be the iteration such that the subtree of
T rooted at v, say Tv, corresponds to TP ↑ p. Then clearly, every rule applicable
in iteration p is also applicable in iteration k. This means every branch of Tv
constructed from a sequence of rule applications is also constructible in iteration
k and hence there must be a branch of T that is isomorphic to such a branch. It
follows from the isomorphism that the isomorphic branch of T cannot contain the
node v.
Associate a logical formula with each node of T as follows.
(i) The formula associated with each (rule) leaf is true.
(ii) The formula associated with a goal node with rule children r1, . . . , rm and
associated formulas F1, . . . , Fm, is F1 ∨ · · · ∨ Fm.
(iii) The formula associated with a rule parent with goal children g1, . . . , gq and
associated formulas G1, . . . , Gq is G1 ∧ · · · ∧Gq.
Let the formula associated with the node v be F . To simplify the exposition,
but at no loss of generality, let us assume that in T , every goal node has exactly
two rule children. Then the formula associated with the root u can be expressed as
E1 ∨ (E2 ∧ (E3 ∨ (· · ·Es−1 ∧ (Es ∨ F )) · · ·)).
By (*) above, we can see that F logically implies E1, F⇒E1. By the structure of
a DDT, we can then express E1 as (F ∨G), for some formula G. Construct a DDT
T ′ from T by deleting the parent of the node v, as well as the subtree rooted at v.
We claim that
(**) The formula associated with the root of T ′ is equivalent to that associated
with the root of T .
To see this, notice that the formula associated with the root of T can now be
expressed as (F ∨G)∨(E2∧(E3∨(· · ·Es−1∧(Es∨F )) · · ·)). By simple application
of propositional identities, it can be seen that this formula is equivalent to (F ∨
G)∨ (E2∧ (E3∨ (· · ·Es− 1∧ (Es)) · · ·)). But this is exactly the formula associated
with the root of T’, which proves (**).
Finally, we shall show that ∨pc, together with any conjunctive mode, satisfy the
following absorption laws:
a ∨pc (a ∧µ b) = a.
a ∧pc (a ∨µ b) = a.
The first of these laws follows from the fact that for all modes µ we consider in
this paper, (a ∧µ b) ≤t a, where ≤t is the lattice ordering. The second is the dual
of the first.
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In view of the absorption laws, it can be seen that the certainty for A computed
by T ′ above is identical to that computed by T . This proves the lemma, since T ′
has at least one fewer violations of simplicity with respect to A.
Lemma 7.2
Let T be a DDT for an atom A. Then there is a simple DDT for A such that the
certainty of A computed by it is identical to that computed by T .
Proof. Follows by an inductive argument using Lemma 7.1.
Lemma 7.3
Let A be an atom and 2h − 1 be the maximum height of any simple DDT for A.
Then certainty of A in TP ↑ l is identical to that in TP ↑ h, for all l ≥ h.
Proof. Let T be the DDT for A corresponding to TP ↑ l. Note that height(T ) =
2l−1. Let c represent the certainty computed by T for A, which is c = TP ↑ l(A). By
Lemma 7.2, there is a simple DDT, say T ′, for A, which computes the same certainty
for A as T . Clearly, height(T ′) ≤ 2h − 1. Let c′ represent the certainty computed
by T ′ for A, c = c′. By the soundness theorem, and monotonicity of TP , we can
write c′ ≤ TP ↑ h(A) ≤ TP ↑ l(A) = c. It follows that TP ↑ l(A) = TP ↑ h(A).
Now we can complete the proof of Theorem 7.1.
Proof of Theorem 7.1. Let 2k − 1 be the maximum height of any simple DDT
for any atom. It follows from the above Lemmas that the certainty of any atom in
TP ↑ l is identical to that in TP ↑ k, for all l ≥ k, from which the theorem follows.
It can be shown that the height of simple DDTs is polynomially bounded by the
database size. This makes the above result significant. This allows us to prove the
following theorem regarding the data complexity of the above class of p-programs.
Theorem 7.2
Let P be a p-program such that only positive correlation is used as the disjunctive
mode for recursive predicates. Then its least fixpoint can be computed in time poly-
nomial in the database size. In particular, bottom-up naive evaluation terminates
in time polynomial in the size of the database, yielding the least fixpoint.
Proof. By Theorem 7.1 we know that the least fixpoint model of P can be computed
in at most k + 1 iterations where h = 2k − 1 is the maximum height of any simple
DDT for any ground atom with respect to P (k iterations to arrive at the fixpoint,
and one extra iteration to verify that a fixpoint has been reached.) Notice that each
goal node in a DDT corresponds to a database predicate. Let K be the maximum
arity of any predicate in P , and n be the number of constants occurring in the
program. Notice that under the data complexity measure (Definition 7.1) K is a
constant. The maximum number of distinct goal nodes that can occur in any branch
of a simple DDT is nK . This implies the height h above is clearly a polynomial in
the database size n. We have thus shown that bottom-up evaluation of the least
fixpoint terminates in a polynomial number of iterations. The fact that the amount
of work done in each iteration is polynomial in n is easy to see. The theorem follows.
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We remark that our proof of Theorem 7.2 implies a similar result for van Em-
den’s framework. To our knowledge, this is the first polynomial time result for
rule-based programming with (probabilistic) uncertainty14. We should point out
that the polynomial time complexity is preserved whenever modes other than posi-
tive correlation are associated with non-recursive predicates (for disjunction). More
generally, suppose R is the set of all recursive predicates and N is the set of non-
recursive predicates in the KB, which are possibly defined in terms of those in R.
Then any modes can be freely used with the predicates in N while keeping the data
complexity polynomial. Finally, if we know that the data does not contain cycles, we
can use any mode even with a recursive predicate and still have a polynomial time
data complexity. We also note that the framework of annotation functions used
in (Kifer & Subrahmanian, 1992) enables an infinite family of modes to be used
in propagating confidences from rule bodies to heads. The major differences with
our work are (i) in (Kifer & Subrahmanian, 1992) a fixed “mode” for disjunction is
imposed unlike our framework, and (ii) they do not study the complexity of query
answering, whereas we establish the conditions under which the important advan-
tage of polynomial time data complexity of classical datalog can be retained. More
importantly, our work has generated useful insights into how modes (for disjunc-
tion) affect the data complexity. Finally, a note about the use of positive correlation
as the disjunctive mode for recursive predicates (when data might contain cycles).
The rationale is that different derivations of such recursive atoms could involve
some amount of overlap (the degree of overlap depends on the data). Now, positive
correlation (for disjunction) tries to be conservative (and hence sound) by assum-
ing the extent of overlap is maximal, so the combined confidence of the different
derivations is the least possible (under ≤t). Thus, it does make sense even from a
practical point of view.
8 Conclusions
We motivated the need for modeling both belief and doubt in a framework for
manipulating uncertain facts and rules. We have developed a framework for prob-
abilistic deductive databases, capable of manipulating both belief and doubt, ex-
pressed as probability intervals. Belief doubt pairs, called confidence levels, give
rise to a rich algebraic structure called a trilattice. We developed a probabilistic
calculus permitting different modes for combining confidence levels of events. We
then developed the framework of p-programs for realizing probabilistic deductive
databases. p-Programs inherit the ability to “parameterize” the modes used for
combining confidence levels, from our probabilistic calculus. We have developed
a declarative semantics, a fixpoint semantics, and proved their equivalence. We
have also provided a sound and complete proof procedure for p-programs. We have
shown that under disciplined use of modes, we can retain the important advantage
14 It is straightforward to show that the data complexity for the framework of
(Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992) is polynomial, although the paper does not address this issue.
However, that framework only allows constant annotations and is of limited expressive power.
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of polynomial time data complexity of classical datalog, in this extended frame-
work. We have also compared our framework with related work with respect to the
aspects of termination and intuitive behavior (of the semantics). The parametric
nature of modes in p-programs is shown to be a significant advantage with re-
spect to these aspects. Also, the analysis of trilattices shows insightful relationships
between previous work (e.g. Ng and Subrahmanian (Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992;
Ng & Subrahmanian, 1993)) and ours. Interesting open issues which merit further
research include (1) semantics of p-programs under various trilattice orders and var-
ious modes, including new ones, (2) query optimization, (3) handling inconsistency
in a framework handling uncertainty, such as the one studied here.
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